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Abstract
Employer learning model predicts the impact of schooling, an observable signal, on wages
decreases with accumulation of experience. Workers, however, have incentives to invest
in general human capital both at schools and workplaces such that experience and school-
ing are complements unless the current employer commits to long-term employment.
Microanalysis of Japanese steel industry indeed shows that experience before employed
by the firm is complementary to schooling and the complementarity effect dominates
employer learning effect while wage growth after employed is consistent with learning
hypothesis. It suggests that previous evidences of employer learning might contain inter-
nal labor market effect.
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1 Introduction
1.1 Total experience or tenure?: Employers’ learning and employees’
incentives of human capital investment
While human capital or productivity of individual workers are hard to observe, educational
background is one of the observable proxies supposed to be correlated to skill and future
performance. It entices employers to statistically discriminate employees based on educational
background, and the statistical discrimination could lead to considerable gap between wages
and realized performance.1 Wage could grow either because human capital is invested in after
employed or because the employer learns employees’ ability endowed before employed, and
it is generally difficult to empirically distinguish them.2 Inspired by the screening hypothesis,
rich empirical results supporting “sheepskin effects” of schooling have been presented for the
US and other several economies.3 While there are evidences that schooling could enhance
productivity, not only work just as a signal, and the quality of education, not only diploma,
does matter,4 it does not necessarily contradict with screening hypothesis. Schooling works
as a strong signal as well as increases productivity. It is established that “sheepskin effects”
themselves exist in all of developed, developing, and even planed economies. Then the issue
in the literature has come to how the effects differ due to institutional arrangements, such as
possible discrimination of gender, ethnic, or racial minority, ownership structure of firm, or
regime of state.
Employer learning is one of the most exciting focal points of such a comparative analysis.
The founders of screening models had interests both in education as a screening device itself
and in social benefit of screening device to improve matching in the job market. Focusing on
the former and considering rich empirical results to support it, the learning models established
by Farber and Gibbons (1996) and Altonji and Pierret (2001) provide a clear prediction under
1While the founders of “education as screening” hypothesis as assumed education just as a screening device,
it could be extended such that education also enhances productivity. Spence (1973), pp. 358-368. Arrow (1973),
pp. 284-287. Tabman and Wales (1973), pp. 43-49. Stiglitz (1975), pp. 175-178. Spence (2002), pp. 436-443.
2Stigler (1962), pp. 100-101.
3For the US, Riley (1979), pp.s240-s251, Lang and Kropp (1987), pp. 618-623, Hungerford and Solon
(1987), pp. 175-177, Belman and Heywood (1991), pp. 721-723, Heywood (1994), pp. 228-232, Jaeger and
Page (1996), pp. 734-738, Belman and Heywood (1997), pp. 628-635, Park (1999), pp. 238-240,Tyler, Murnane
and Willett (2000), pp. 445-447, Bedard (2001), pp. 760-774, Pinkston (2003), pp. 651-656, Bollinger and
Hirsch (2006), pp. 511-513, Trostel and Walker (2004), pp. 1965-1966, Clark and Jaeger (2006), pp. 772-788.
Bitzan (2009), pp. 761-764. Hansen, Weisbrod and Scanlon (1970), pp. 411-416, also gives some evidences that
became a part of screening hypothesis. For Japan, Bauer, Dross and Haisken-DeNew (2005), pp. 323-331. For
the UK, MacGuinnes (2003), pp. 599-606, Silles (2008), pp. 218-219. For Canada, Ferrer and Riddell (2008),
pp. 885-902, Ferrer and Riddell (2002), pp. 191-211, Caponi and Plesca (2009), pp. 1113-1124. For Spain,
Pons and Blanco (2005), pp. 336-343, Pons (2006), pp. 144-151. For Czech, a transition economy, Mu¨nich,
Svejnar and Terrell (2005a), pp. 104-119, and Mu¨nich, Svejnar and Terrell (2005b), pp. 280-293, which examine
differences over regimes, firm ownerships, and gender during the transition period. Denny and Harmon (2001),
p. 636, gives a quick comparison among the US, the UK, Canada, Ireland, and Sweden.
4Those evidences include Layard and Psacharopoulos (1974), pp. 989-992, Wolpin (1977), pp. 954-957.
Groot and Oosterbeek (1994), pp. 319-321, Card and Krueger (1992), pp. 31-36, for the US, Chevalier, Harmon,
Walker and Zhu (2004), pp. F505-516, for the UK, and Patrinos (1996), pp. 171-173, for Guatemala.
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the competitive labor market that impact of schooling on wage decreases over workers’ ex-
perience in the labor market as employers learn workers’ types hidden at the time when they
join the labor market. This learning effect is in estimation practice captured by non-increasing
coefficient of the interaction of schooling and experience on a wage regression, and their em-
pirical results support the prediction quite well, followed by supporting works about the US
labor market.5
A simple, but not negligible feature common with Farber and Gibbons (1996) and Altonji
and Pierret (2001) is in that they do not differentiate workers’ experience before and after
entering long-term employment, hence implicitly assume that learning go through “public”ly,
or, symmetrically between incumbent employer and outside employers and that interaction be-
tween schooling and experience in principle do not change even after workers are successfully
employed by a large firm that commits to long-term employment.
The employer learning hypothesis is straightforward from the viewpoint of employers who
use educational background as a screening device and consistent empirical evidence has been
presented as well. There still exists, however, some point yet to be inquired. Non-increasing
coefficient of interaction term between schooling and experience implies not only that the
employer is learning but also that schooling and experience are not complements, or their
complementarity effect was sufficiently weak to be dominated by the employer’s learning ef-
fect.6 If non-increasing coefficient of interaction between schooling and experience observed,
the result itself is a puzzle from the viewpoint of employees’ incentives for human capital
investment, observed under technology-skill complementarity.
In the German case, for instance, as Gathmann and Schoenberg (2010) clearly demon-
strates, young workers typically invest in “potable” general human capital as switching jobs
several times in their early stages of career, and then enter employment of long-term basis.7
Also, productivity of labor and education of worker are thought to be closely correlated since
the early 20th century, as industrial economies have experienced technology-skill/education
complementary development.8 In fact, educational background of workers has accordingly
emerged as the important proxy of ability in workplaces exactly on this context of technology-
skill/education complementarity.
Under the technology-skill/education complementary development, workers likely choose
work experiences to invest in general human capital complementary to their educational back-
ground before he/she joins a firm that commits to long-term employment and internal promo-
tion, i.e., internal labor market policy. Then schooling and experience might be complements.
This effect would work to make interaction between schooling and work experience increasing
over time.
On the other hand, if the current employee commits to long-term employment and internal
promotion, then the employee has incentives of investment in the industry-specific and/or firm-
specific human capital,9 which might be less complementary to schooling, an opportunity of
5Farber and Gibbons (1996), pp. 1010-1018. Altonji and Pierret (2001), pp. 316-323. Lange (2007), pp.
4-7. Oyer (2008), pp.278-287.
6Farber and Gibbons (1996), p. 1017.
7Gathmann and Schoenberg (2010), pp. 10-36.
8Fallon and Layard (1975), p. 295. Goldin and Katz (1998), pp.710-723.
9Based on the NLSY, Parent (2000), pp. 308-320, shows that industry-specificity has larger impact on wages
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investment in general human capital. If complementarity between schooling and industry-
and/or firm-specific skill is sufficiently weak to be dominated by employer learning effect,
then the interaction between schooling and tenure in the firm is expected to be non-increasing
over time.
While employer learning model is entitled as “public” learning model, its prediction in
fact seems to better fit with employer learning process within internal labor market of large
firms from the viewpoint of dynamics of workers investment in human capital, instead of the
competitive outside market. The employer learning prediction has possibly captured wage
growth distorted by internal labor market of large firms.
Indeed, succeeding close interest in the original employer learning model, Galindo-Rueda
(2003), Scho¨nberg (2007), Pinkston (2009) are conscious of a possible asymmetry in employer
learning and thus particular effect of tenure in total experience, Bauer and Haisken-DeNew
(2001) deals with human capital investment complementary to schooling, and Baker, Gibbs
and Holmstrom (1994b) and Lluis (2005) deal with wage dynamics of internal labor markets.
Knitting up these three attractive strands, this research tries to distinguish learning effects in
wage growth in and out of internal labor market effect, using panel data of the Japanese steel
industry exactly at the time when it introduced internal labor market policy.
1.2 Technology, skill, and organization
Desirable structure of organization depends on prevalence of relevant information, and techno-
logical conditions shape informational structure. Technological changes affect organizational
structure in this way. It particularly holds for labor organization within a firm. Technological
changes affect type of necessary skill, and it could determine which player, either employees
or the firm, knows the skill better. If the firm knows better about necessary skill, then direct
control of labor organization could provide employees with better incentives. Given technol-
ogy, skill and information structure, a firm chooses a better organization to reduce loss from
asymmetric information. In other words, through the firm’s decision, combination of technol-
ogy, skill, and informational structure shapes labor organization. Internal labor market is a
potential candidate when a firm knows necessary skills well and the skills are complementary
to each other and/or firm-specific.10
Internal labor markets characterized by long-term employment and internal promotion are
widely seen for high-skilled workers of large companies in developed economies. Labor orga-
nizations of white-collar employees and high-class engineers are not uniquely determined by
than firm-specificity alone, which intuitively persuasive to us as a wage earner and seems to be applicable to
other economies than the US. In addition, Weinberg (2001), pp.236-247, verifies that industry specificity does
shield wages from exogenous shocks. Then, Poletaev and Robinson (2008), pp. 402-413, extracts impact of
skill-specificity on wages, embedded in industry-specificity. At the same time, Shaw and Lazer (2008), pp. 717-
720, extracts specific productivity gain of tenure at a specific firm, which implies the existence of firm-specific
human capital and the relevancy of that at least to some extent. Therefore, more correctly, we had better state
that internal labor market of a specific firm exists and it consists of industry-specificity and specific composition
of skills. For simplicity, we tentatively skip the logical step here.
10Doeringer and Piore (1971), pp. 1-7. Williamson, Wachter and Harris (1975), pp. 269-277. Milgrom and
Roberts (1992), pp. 358-385.
3
technology and are often firm-specific, so internal labor markets are widely applied on white-
collar employees and engineers. It is also introduced for ordinary blue-collar employees of
manufacturing in some industries where systematic procedures are required typically as in
steel, petroleum refineries, paper mills, and so on.11 These industries, at the same time, are the
very ones which Goldin and Katz (1998) asserts have grown with technology-skill/education
complementarity since the early 20th century.12
Empirical and descriptive works on the issue in the last two decades have rejected the
traditional conjecture that, either in the US and in Japan, the internal labor market implies
wage dynamics irrelevant to performance or merit. Rather, it is a evaluation device as a second
best approach to make wages sensitive to performance of employees and to give employees
incentives of investment in industry- and/or firm-specific human capital under asymmetric
information. Thus it is expected the wages do not depart market price equal to marginal
productivity in the long term on average, though they are not necessarily one-to-one equal in
the short term.13
Japanese manufacturing, led by the steel industry as in the US, headed that way in the
1920s, and after the Second World War, developed even more internal-labor-market-oriented.
Then “life time employment” came to be known as a feature of the Japanese manufacturing.
As the US firms of good performance has continuously managed long-term employment,14 it
is not a unique culture of Japanese firm, while it is true that post-war Japanese firms have more
steeply tilted to long-term employment and wage growth with tenure.15 The point is arguably
in that Japan experienced a faster and deeper transition of the same direction shared with other
developed economies.
1.3 Transformation in the steel industry
Different from typically 20th century industries like petroleum refineries, transition to the
internal labor market of major industries with longer tradition was accompanied by dissolu-
tion of autonomous intermediary labor organization into well organized labor organization
directly and systematically planned by firms, as pointed out by the radical economists and
then redefined as transition to a more efficient second best organization by new institutional
economists.16 Such a transition would proceed with technological transition that provides
firms with informational advantages in acquisition of relevant human capital, which makes
direct control by the firm relatively efficient.
11Doeringer and Piore (1971), pp. 6, 50-51, 58.
12Goldin and Katz (1998), pp. 707-716.
13Alexander (1974), pp. 74-83, Aoki (1988), pp. 54-60. Baker, Gibbs and Holmstrom (1994a), pp. 881-884.
Baker and Holmstrom (1995), pp. 256-257.
14Hall (1980), pp. 97-107. Hall (1982), pp. 719-720. A measure of the importance of long-term employment
in human capital investment is relative impact of tenure at a firm and total work experience on wages. Abe (2000)
shows based on the data of the 1980s that tenure alone had considerable impact on wages in the US while relative
importance of tenure over experience is indeed larger in Japan than in the US (Abe (2000), pp. 261-264.).
15Hashimoto and Raisian (1985), pp. 721-732. Aoki (1988), pp. 59-69. Mincer and Higuchi (1988), pp. 112-
115. Moriguchi (2003), pp. 640-652. While mobility of younger generations have increased since the 1990s,
long-term employment is still prevailed practice among large Japanese firms. Ono (2010), pp. 13-22.
16Marglin (1974), pp. 60-81. Stone (1974), pp. 128-147. Williamson (1985), pp. 206-239.
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As to the Japanese steel industry, big two phases of technological transition were seen
in the 1920s and in the 1950s as larger open-hearth furnaces were introduced, and in the
1960s when converter furnaces were introduced under the American influence. Along with
the technological transition, traditional skill ascriptive to individual senior employees was
transformed to the skill manualized and known to the management.17 As with in the American
steel industry,18 it was the core in the transition to frame a work organization with systematic
wage and promotion scheme.
This paper deals with wage growth of blue-collar employees from 1929 to 1969 of the
Kamaishi Iron Works,19 a leading iron works then in Japan, and approaches to wage dynamics
during formation of internal labor market. To be analyzed is micro data of 1490 employees of
the Kamaishi Iron Works.
The section 2 presents the estimation model. The section 3 describes the data and then
verifies existence of internal labor market at the case firm. The section 4 gives empirical
results.
2 Estimation model under internal labor market effect
2.1 Employer learning
Consider a random effect model of panel least square regression of ith employee’s wage (w)
at time t,
(1) wi;t = 0 + 2yosi + 2yosi  t+ 3t+ i + i;t;
where yosi stands for years of schooling that is observable to employer and stochastic i cap-
tures time-invariant characteristics unobserved by the employer.
And put
(2) twi;t = 2yosi + 3 +tE(i j yosi; t  1) +ti;t  2yosi + 3 + 'i;t;
where 'i;t is shock in the tth year.
Then inference based on the public learning model by Farber and Gibbons (1996) and
Altonji and Pierret (2001) brings a straightforward prediction as a benchmark.20 Linear pro-
jection of wi;t gives
E(wi;t j yosi) =^0 + ^1yosi + ^2yosi  t+ ^3t
=^0 + ^1yosi +
Cov(wi;t; yosi  t)
V (yosi  t)
yosi  t+ ^3t
=^0 + ^1yosi +
Pt
=2Cov('i; ; yosi  )
V (yosi  t)
yosi  t+ ^3t:
(3)
17In the case of department of maintenance, the Kamaishi Iron Works, intangible knowledge that had bee
inherited from senior workers to younger workers was made standardized, written as a rich manual and controlled
by the firm in the early 1970s. Nakamura (2010), pp. 24-25.
18Novack and Perlman (1962), pp. 339-347. Stone (1974), pp. 128-136. Williamson (1985), pp. 234-236.
19belonged to Fuji Iron and Steel Corporation then, now belongs to Nippon Steel Corporation.
20Farber and Gibbons (1996), pp. 1010-1018. Altonji and Pierret (2001), pp. 316-323.
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First, if schooling and experience are complements (@2y=(@yos@) > 0), then Covi('i; yos
) > 0, and otherwise Covi('i; yos  ) = 0, for each  ( = 2; : : : ; t). Second, if the
employer learns employees’ characteristics hidden when recruiting, which is captured by i,
then Covt('t; yos t) = 0 for each i.
Suppose that wages, with marginal productivity, increase over experience and standardize
variables by taking logarithmic terms.21 Then, predicted are,
(a) If the employer learns employees’ hidden characteristics over time, and if schooling and
experience are not complements or the effect of their complementarity is dominated by
that of employer’s learning, then ^2 is expected to be negative.22
(b) If schooling and experience are complements and the the effect of complementarity
dominates that of the employer learning, then ^2 is expected to be positive.
Based on the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth of the US, empirical evidences to
support (a) have been presented.23 It is also doomed that employer learning progresses fast
especially in the first few years.24
2.2 Employees’ incentives, asymmetric learning, and diversified labor
markets
This prediction of employer learning does not explicitly consider workers’ dynamic decision
making of ivestment in human capital. Workers are reasonably expected to choose work-
places to maximize lifetime income, given their educational background. While both of the
schooling market and the labor market have frictions, friction with choice of schools seems
to be much larger.25 It was the case especially prewar Japan where public elementary and
secondary schools were dominant, and districts of elementary schools were determined by
the government as they are now. Thus typically young people enrolled in assigned schools,
graduated them, and finally made their own conscious decision when they chose workplaces.
Without particular constraints, people in the competitive open market, especially under
employment contracts of short-term basis, are naturally to choose work experiences such that
schooling and work experiences are complements if other conditions are the same.
21While the standard wage regression of Mincer style regress logarithmic term of wage on raw level numbers,
here in this research regressors are also transformed to logarithmic terms because estimation of the equation
(4) with controlling all of cohort effects requires already many independent variables. The standard estimation
model needs to contain squared terms of experience and tenure to allow their effects to be marginally decreasing,
but adding squared terms here makes estimation results less readable. To allow experience and tenure effects
to be marginally decreasing, here their logarithmic terms are used as regressors instead of squared terms of raw
level.
22In the raw level term, non complementarity implies significantly zero of ^2. Standardization taking log-
arithmic term means, with increase of relative impact of time variant factors such as tenure, relative impact of
interaction between schooling and tenure decreases over time if they are not complementary, which implies a
negative sign.
23Farber and Gibbons (1996), pp. 1023-1029. Altonji and Pierret (2001), pp.329-342. Lange (2007), pp. 4-7.
24Gibbons, Katz, Lemieux and Parent (2005), pp. 698-714. Lange (2007), pp. 9-19. A similar case in
Germany is presented by Lluis (2005), pp. 745-755.
25In addition, kids themselves tend to be ignorant about return of schooling as reported by Jensen (2010).
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This direction of human capital investment has become even more desirable since the
early 20th century, as technology-skill/education complementarity has become augmented
with transition of production process from artisanal shops to factory system, continuous pro-
duction system, and “computerized” production line26.
On the other hand, if the current employer commits to operating internal labor market
policy consisting of long-term employment and internal promotion, then the employees could
have incentives to invest in industry- and/or firm-specific human capital that might be less
complementary to general skills that have been taught at schools. Indeed, in the case of the
US, industry-specificity of human capital obviously decrease mobility of workers, and induce
firms to protect wages and employment of experienced workers against exogenous shocks
more than they do to young workers. That kind of commitment is necessary to entice workers
invest in industry- and/or firm-specific human capital.27
The intensity of technology-skill/educatoin complementarity and employers’ adjustment
to it could affect institutional arrangement in the labor market and accordingly employer learn-
ing process. In the German case, after Bauer and Haisken-DeNew (2001) found the dominant
effect of complementarity between schooling and experience and rejected employer learning
effect,28 Lluis (2005) succeeded in carefully mining some evidence of employer learning by
controlling job-rank effects.29 The German labor market appears to be modeled as friendly
to investment in general human capital, compared with those in the US, the UK,30 and Japan
inquired by this research.
Another issue is the extent of asymmetry in employer learning. About the US labor mar-
ket, Pinkston (2009) finds that informational structure in employer learning is asymmetrically
favorable to incumbent employers and thus tenure has impact on learning additional to total
experience,31 while Scho¨nberg (2007) evaluates that the asymmetry is not so large as it af-
fects the speed of employer learning.32 About the UK, on the other hand, as Galindo-Rueda
(2003) recognizes strong evidence of employer learning, it also finds stronger learning effect
of tenure, instead of total experience of workers, and asserts that incumbent employers have
informational advantage in learning over entrant employers.33 As later shown on Table 3, the
same effect is clearly observed in the Japanese labor market.
Diversity of labor markets consists of institutional framework that encourages human capi-
tal investment and informational structure that enables employers to learn workers’ types. The
coefficient of interaction term between schooling and experience is the tractable measure of
employer learning. At the same time, this is a focal point of diversity of labor markets, which
varies depending on institutions of human capital investment and informational structure about
workers’ types.
26Goldin and Katz (1996), pp. 253-256. Goldin and Katz (1998), pp. 698-719. Autor, Katz and Kearney
(2006), pp. 190-191.
27Weinberg (2001), pp. 236-251.
28Bauer and Haisken-DeNew (2001), pp. 163-177.
29Lluis (2005), pp. 749-755.
30Galindo-Rueda (2003), pp. 8-17,
31Pinkston (2009), pp. 381-389.
32Scho¨nberg (2007), pp. 672-678.
33Galindo-Rueda (2003), pp. 13-15.
7
2.3 Identification of the internal labor market effect in the wage growth
With concerns about investment in human capital, workers are expected to invest in general
human capital both at schools and workplaces if their employers do not commit to internal
labor market policy. On the other hand, employers do not generally have incentives to invest
in general human capital of employees. If any, employers willingly invest in environments
favorable to accumulation of firm-specific human capital. Then employees could have incen-
tives of investment in firm-specific human capital if their employers do commit to internal
labor market policy.
To capture this effect of internal labor market that potentially slips into strings of wage
determination, empirical exercise later separates ith employee’s experiences before and after
he joined the firm that commits to internal labor market policy such as t = epr = pvr + ten,
where pvr is experience before he joined the case firm, ten is tenure at the firm, and epr is
total experience. Then the wage regression equation (3) is reformulated as
wi;t = 0 + 1yosi
+ 2yosi  pvr + 3yosi  ten
+ 4epr + 5ten + 
Txi + 
Txi  ten + i + i;t;
(4)
where xi stands for time-invariant characteristics vector other than educational background.34
Taking logarithmic terms of variables, predictions from employer learning combined with
workers’ concerns about investment in human capital are,
Prediction 1. the interaction term between years of schooling and previous experience before
employed by the firm (yos  pvr) is expected to have positive coefficient (^2 > 0), which
indicates that complementarity between schooling and work experiences is strong enough to
dominate the employer’s learning effect,
and,
Prediction 2. the interaction term between years of schooling and tenure after employed by
the firm (yos ten) is expected to have negative coefficient (^3 < 0), which indicates that the
firm learns employees’ hidden characteristics over tenure, and that schooling and tenure are
not complements, or the learning effect dominates their complementarity effect if any.
It is examined in the section 4.3 whether this prediction is supported or not.
34Bauer and Haisken-DeNew (2001), pp. 163-170, applies this formulation of regression on the German data
to inquire whether employers’ go “public”ly in the labor market (through workers’ total experience) or “private”ly
(thorough tenure at specific firms), and denies any employer learning effect, which is strikingly different result
from the US and Japan cases. We will be back to this point in the section 5.1. Also, Scho¨nberg (2007) adds
tenure to experience as regressors in the wage regression, to inquire possible difference in learning processes of
incumbent and outside employers.35
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3 The case firm and the data
3.1 Kamaishi Iron Works on its historical context
Kamaishi IronWorks is the oldest iron works in Japan, opened by the Nambu Domain in 1857.
After nationalized in 1873 and privatized again in 1884, new blast furnaces were built and
began continuous production from iron to steel in 1903. After owned by the Mitsui holdings,
the largest conglomerate, in 1924, it was merged with other major iron works into Nippon
Iron and Steel in 1933. The merge was coordinated by the government for technological
improvement. Traditional skill required for the early 20th century technology had developed
in its labor organization as it started modernization efforts in the 1930s.
Then, Japan entered the war against the US, and during the wartime isolation, Japanese
steel industry turned out to be backward. After the SecondWorld War, steel companies as well
as other important manufacturing companies were induced to invest in new technology with
long-term financing coordinated by the government. For the iron and steal industry, three co-
ordinated modernization investments were planned. The “1st plan” was 1951-1954, the “2nd
plan” was 1956-1960, and the “3rd plan” was 1961-1964. Through the plan, for the Kamaishi
Iron Works, then an iron works of Fuji Iron and Steel, now Nippon Steel, improvement of ef-
ficiency in iron and steel production and expansion of fine steel production were emphasized,
but replacement of old blast furnaces was not planned.
A big change during the modernization since the 1950s at production lines was standard-
ization, or “manualization,” of production procedures. Before the Second World War, in the
iron and steal industry, sophisticated procedures of production were developed by employees
and taught to younger employees by the elder. Since the 1950s, however, procedures of pro-
ductions lines became manualized by better educated engineers, and the best practices at the
shop floor came to be known to the firm.36
As a part of company wide investment plan, Fuji Iron and Steel decided to build a new
state-of-the-art plant called Tokai in Nagoya, now an iron works of Nippon Steel. Because
it was a new plant, skilled workers were not there. About iron production capacity, the firm
decided to decrease Kamaishi’s and to increase other new plants such as Tokai, and to relocate
skilled workers of Kamaishi and other old iron works to Tokai. Then 1,678 skilled workers
moved from Kamaishi to Tokai in 1964, 1967, 1968, and 1969.37
3.2 The data
This research uses preserved 1,490 of relocated Kamaishi employees’ panel data of wages,
tracking from the late 1920s or later, depending on employee, to the 1960s, when they left
Kamaishi. This data set has both considerable disadvantage and advantage.
The disadvantage is about selection and survival biases. Selection for relocation was han-
dled under close dialogue and coordination between the firm and the union, and, in principle,
36Nakamura (2010), pp. 8-21.
37With 1,678 from Kamaishi, 908 from Muroran, 972 from Hirohata, and 127 from Kawasaki were relocated.
Umezaki (2010), pp. 33-38.
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anyone who was willing to move were accepted. Thus, there was not a clear and intended
measure to select employees for relocation.38 However, it is not followed that this is an unbi-
ased sample set. First, employees who willingly moved to Nagoya were those who believed
that they would get successfully used to the most advanced plant. They were more ambitious
and/or self-confident employees than average. Second, all of the sample employees were those
who had worked until they moved to Nagoya in the 1960s. The “losers” in the internal com-
petition at Kamaishi who dropped are not included. Selected employees were likely to be the
employees trained to get used to new technology, and well built-in internal labor market that
was formed during the technological transition.
At the same time, the data set also has advantages respectable especially for this research.
Intrinsically to original personnel documents, the documents contain all important information
on employees’ CV when they were employed. It enables us to recover their whole life from
the time when they were born to the late 1960s when they were relocated. The information
includes records of previous working experiences not only educational record, and physical
features such as height, weight, and lung capacity, which were thought to be important for
blue-collar workers.
Each individual wage record includes:
1. Educational background (yos).
2. Physical characteristics when employed: height (hgt), weight and lung capacity.
3. Panel data of
(1) record of in-house training if the employee completed one:
 Systematic programs for those selected from newly employed employees:
1927-1935: “Youth Development Center (Seinen Kunrenjo)” (ydc). Three
days a week, 4 years, 300 hours as total.
1935-1948: “School for Youth (Seinen Gakko)” (sy). Halftime, three days a
week.
1939-1946: “Development Center for Technicians (Ginosha Yoseijo)” (dct).
Fulltime, 3 years, 6,453 hours as total.
1946-1973: “Development Center (Kyoshujo)” (dc). Three days a week, 2
years (by 1950), 6 days a week (from 1950). From 1953, only
high school graduates were admitted.
 Short term programs (ex. elementary calculus).
(2) licenses the employee held.
(3) family composition.
(4) clinical history.
(5) basic wages.
38Umezaki (2010), pp.47-49.
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(6) promotion and deployment: classes, division and department assignment, and job
assignment. The 49 divisions, 174 departments and 110 jobs have been recorded
in the total.
The panel data of the basic wage starts when the employee joined the firm, and ends at the
time when he moved to the Tokai Iron Works, varying from 1964 to 1969.
Composition of cohorts is shown on Table 1. A small peak is across from 1938 to 1942,
when the wartime effort hit the peak with invasion to China in earnest from 1937 and the attack
to the Pearl Harbor in 1941, followed by the American backfire including carpet bombing on
the city of Kamaishi, and a bigger peak is across from 1948 to 1951, when the Japanese
economy began to recover from the wartime destruction.
An especially important feature of the data set is in that those who were employed im-
mediately after graduation are not dominant, which might not look typical in Japanese firm.
The recruitment practice to employ new graduates was being prevailed for blue-collar work-
ers since the mid 1960s, and not typical at all before that time. Indeed, the mean of previous
experience (years after graduating school and before being employed by the firm, pvr) is even
not monotonically decreasing.
Since the late 19th century, when the heavy manufacturing was introduced from the West-
ern world, career path of experiencing several workplaces to acquire skill and then to be em-
ployed by a large firm in the long-term basis, or to start own workshop became a typical one
among skilled workers. This tradition is not only well exploited by this research strategy on
the equation (4). So-called “port of entry” practice of typical “Japanese firm,” under which
employees are employed immediately after they graduate schools without experience at any
other workplace was not prevailed for blue-collar workers even at the leading firm of the steel
industry, the core industry then, in the covered period. It could allow empirical results of this
research to be comparable to other industrial economies.
Compulsory education was extended from 6 years to 9 years in 1947, as shown in the min-
imum years of schooling on Table 1. Difference of educational background across employees
who graduated before 1947 is distributed mainly between 6 years of completing mandatory
elementary school and 8 years composed of mandatory 6 years and 2 yeas of completing high
elementary school. Table 1 shows graduates of high elementary school were majority before
1947.39 Difference of employees who graduated after 1947 is distributed mainly between the
mandatory 9 yeas of elementary school (6 years) and junior high school (3 years) and the 12
years of mandatory 9 years plus additional 3 years of high school. High school graduates were
minority still in the 1960s.
3.3 Verifying existence of internal labor market
Before estimating the equation (4), the existence of internal labor market policy, which some-
how “shields” wage determination from the outside market, itself to be empirically estab-
lished. We basically follow the strategy presented by Baker et al. (1994b).
39Already in the 1920s, major factories of heavy industry had preference of graduates of high elementary
schools to those of elementary schools, especially for candidates of foremen. Sugayama (2011), p. 37.
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If a firm offers competitive wages to revealed characteristics such as educational back-
ground of prospective employees in the market when the firm recruits workers, and if the firm
adopts internal labor market policy under which wages are determined based on internal rules
or evaluation that not more or less “shield”s internal wage dynamics from the market price,
then wage growth of each cohort could share common trend “shiled”ed from the market price.
Thus survival of cohort effect is a useful indicator of existence of internal labor market that
somehow “shields” wage determination from the outside price mechanism at each point,40
though it does not imply wage that the dynamics deviates the market price in the long term.
Table 2 contains regression of real daily wages (rw) on experience in the labor market
(epr), tenure (ten), years joined dummy (yj), and interaction between years joined dummy
and tenure (yj  ten). To control composition effect of educational background varying over
cohorts, years of schooling (yos) is also inserted as a regressor. The period saw a rapid growth
of average productivity, which is controlled by year dummies. On the model 1-2, to allow
marginally decreasing of cohort effect, interaction term of years joined dummy and tenure
(yj ten) is inserted as a regressor instead of tenure (ten).41
Cohort effects generally survive among employees of all cohorts. The internal labor market
at the Kamaishi Iron Works seems to have been formed in the 1930s. This statistical inference
is consistent with descriptive picture based on documents and hearings.42
Thus the basic wage at the first year shows the open market price of his labor, and the
growth of the basic wage in the following year shows the firm’s evaluation of his labor based
on some internal measures.
In addition, wage rw shows obvious serial correlation. Auto regression with random ef-
fects of real wage (rwten), with years of education (yosi) and year dummies inserted, gives,43
(5) log rwten = 0:3424
21:6217
  0:0080
16:1141
yos + 0:8426
354:7567
log rwten 1;
where absolute value of the coefficient of lagged term (rwten 1) is smaller than 1, which
means each history of wage is a contraction mapping.44 Thus each wage history is heading for
somewhere stationary.
Furthermore, a regression of real wage on more lagged terms gives with random effects
40Baker et al. (1994b), pp. 923, 933-940. Baker and Holmstrom (1995), pp. 258-259.
41Our approach differs from Baker et al. (1994b) in some important points. In order to avoid identification
difficulty but to extract cohort effect, Baker et al. (1994b) assumes that tenure effect on wage growth is linear
and estimates the coefficient of linear regression of wages on tenure, deducts the estimated tenure effect from
cohort average wage, and regress this adjusted cohort average wage on cohort dummies. However, tenure effect
is not necessarily linear in general. Also, two-staged estimation seems to have cohort effect appear larger than
real. Hence, to deal with identification problem, we simply bind adjacent two cohorts together into one group,
and then regress wages on two-cohort groups.
42Umezaki (2010), pp. 42-51.
43Estimation: Panel estimated generalized least squares with cross-section random effects. Year dummies:
Yes. Sample periods: 40 (1930-1969). Cross-sections included: 1,482. Total panel observations: 20,511. The t
statistics are within parentheses, where  stands for significance smaller than 1 percent. Adjusted R2: 0:9691.
F -statistic: 15; 706:8328.
44It implies that extended growth curve of wage has unique fixed point.
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and year dummies gives,45
log rwten = 0:3338
(21:2829)
  0:0004
0:7289
yos
+ 0:4450
(52:8953)
log rwten 1 + 0:1485
(17:6055)
log rwten 2
+ 0:0765
(9:0439)
log rwten 3 + 0:0592
(7:4901)
log rwten 4
+ 0:0640
(8:4776)
log rwten 5 + 0:0394
(5:5702)
log rwten 6
+ 0:0332
(5:1365)
log rwten 7 + 0:0226
(4:8108)
log rwten 8:
(6)
While the past has significant impact on the current wage growth, the impact is monotonically
decreasing, with each wage history going to some stable phase.46
Periods in concern saw rapid growth of labor productivity in the industry, hence average
wage accordingly rapidly grew on average. On the equations (5) and (6), however, the effect
is controlled by the year dummies inserted.
Therefore, followed from serial correlations seen on the equations (5) and (6), first, the
sample employees are heterogeneous and there were “systematic winners and losers”47 prob-
ably due to different ability of human capital accumulation,48 and second, wage dynamics is
on trajectory to some steady state, which is supposed to be true value of the employee’s “la-
tent” ability. Though this process with serial correlation is not directly drawn from the “pure”
employer learning model, it is consistent with secondary story derived from the employer
learning model. If the employer, for instance, uses accumulated information for assignment
of employees, then such a regularly serial correlation could be observed 49
Thus the monotonic shape of trajectory is at least partly due to the employer’s learning
process.
4 Empirical results
4.1 Overview: Tenure, employer’s learning, and in-house training
Before directly going to estimation of the equation (4), let us give an overview based on the
ordinary regression equation (3). Table 3 gives results of random effect estimation regressing
real wage (rw) on height when employed by the firm (hgt), years of schooling the employee
45Estimation: Panel estimated generalized least squares with cross-section random effects. Year dummies:
Yes. Sample periods: 33 (1937-1969). Cross-section included: 1,093. Total panel observations 11,393. Adjusted
R2: 0:9623. F statistic: 7099:4704.
46Absolute values of all real roots of 1 0:4450z 0:1485z2 0:0765:z3 0:0592z4 0:0640z5 0:0394z6 
0:0332z7   0:0226z8 = 0, z =  1:8900; 1:0476, are greater than 1, which implies the auto-regression equation
(6) is stationary as the equation (5) is.
47Baker and Holmstrom (1995), p. 257. The result is theoretically predicted by symmetric learning of the
employer and the employee (Gibbons and Waldman (1999), pp. 1333-1341.).
48Baker et al. (1994b), p. 947.
49Baker et al. (1994b), pp. 924, 926-927.
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had completed (yos), experience in the labor market (epr), tenure at the firm (ten), interaction
of height and experience (hgt  epr), interaction of height and tenure (hgt  ten), interac-
tion of years of schooling and experience (yos  epr), interaction of years of schooling and
tenure (yos ten), dummy variables of completing in-house training programs, Development
Center for Youth (dcy, operated in 1927-1935), School of Youth (sy, operated in 1935-1948),
Development Center for Technicians (dct, operated in 1939-1946), Development Center (dc,
operated in 1946-1973), interaction of them and tenure (dcy  ten, sy  ten, dct  ten,
dc  ten).50 The compulsory schooling was extended rom 6 years of elementary school to
9 years of 6-year elementary school and 3-year junior high school in 1947. Since extension
of compulsory schooling could have big impact of wages,51 the postwar education generation
dummy (psw) is inserted.
Tenure is robustly significant in all regressions. Experience within the firm strongly con-
tributed to wage growth. At the same time, the employer learning hypothesis strongly holds
when the data set handled as a whole. On Table 3, interaction terms of years of schooling both
with experience after graduation (yos epr) and tenure (yos ten) are significantly negative
in the models of 3-2 and 3-4. Negatively significant coefficient of yos ten indicates that the
current employer learned better than previous employers, as the British case.52
As well as years of schooling, a proxy of ability observable to the employer when em-
ployed is physical characteristics such as height. Height is thought to sometime affect wages
sometime,53 while the channel is still ambiguous especially for white-collar workers.54 In
the case of blue-collar workers in the steel industry, the industry of masculine then, however,
the physical strength was definitely critical especially in the department of pig iron produc-
tion where workers required to be tough against extremely high-temperature and to still make
difficult decision about how to manage blast-furnace that determined the quality of pig iron,
the raw material of high-value-added of fine steel. Thus height is a good proxy of physical
strength. Again, also about height, the employer’s learning hypothesis holds. Interaction terms
of height with tenure (hgt  ten) has significantly negative coefficient in the models 3-3 and
3-4.
4.2 Schooling and in-house training programs
Table 3 also shows that role of training programs changed over time. The interaction of post-
war program with tenure (dc ten) has significantly negative coefficient while the interaction
terms of prewar programs with tenure (dcy  ten; sy  ten; dct  ten) have significantly
positive ones in the models 3-1, 3-2, 3-3, and 3-4.
All of Development Center for Youth, School of Youth, Development Center for Techni-
cians, and Development Center were operated exclusively for newly employed employees at
entry-level. As some of entry-level employees were chosen, the employer had not yet learned
50Some samples lack the information of height, weight, and lung capacity.
51Oleopoulos (2005), pp. 158-170.
52Galindo-Rueda (2003), pp. 13-15.
53Hersch (2008), pp. 369-375.
54Kuhn and Weinberger (2005), pp. 418-420.
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hidden types of employees and the firm likely used some proxy to choose trainees from newly
employed employees. In particular, the change in sign of interaction terms from prewar the
programs (dcy, sy, dct) to the postwar program (dc) can be attributed to selection policy of
Development Center (dc), which admitted only high school graduates since 1953. Closely
linked to educational back ground, the effect of in-house training program also came to de-
crease over time as the employer learned types of employees hidden when employed.
4.3 Internal labor market effect
The empirical overview so far has established that employer learning hypothesis saliently
holds particularly after employed as interactions of years of schooling and height with tenure
(yos ten, hgt ten) have significantly negative coefficients. Next we proceed to extraction
of some information about interaction between employees’ history before employed by the
firm and wages.
Now examine the equation (4) and the drawn Prediction 1. and Prediction 2. in the
section 2.3. Table 4 presents a regression of real wage (rw) on years of schooling (yos),
experience after graduation and before employed by the firm (pvr), tenure after employed by
the firm (ten), interaction of cohort dummy, years of schooling and previous experience before
employed by the firm (yj yos pvr), interaction terms of cohort dummy, years of schooling
and tenure (yj yos ten), with controlling training programs (dcy, sy, dct, dc), interaction
terms between training programs and tenure (dcy  ten, sy  ten, dct ten, dc ten), and
interactions between year dummy and years of schooling (dy  yos) to capture changes in
return of schooling over the period.
Then, except for early cohorts up to the mid 1930s, interaction term between years of
schooling and tenure (yos ten) has significantly negative coefficients also here, which sup-
ports the employer learning hypothesis by Farber and Gibbons (1996) and Altonji and Pierret
(2001) as well as the Prediction 2. in the section 2.3. However, interaction of years of school-
ing and previous experience (yos  pvr) has significantly positive coefficient, which violates
the employer learning hypothesis and supports the Predictions 1. of workers behavior in
human capital ivestment in the section 2.3.
An immediate interpretation of the result on Table 4, considering average years of pre-
vious experience on Table 1, is that workers had chosen workplace experiences given their
educational background such that they were in fact complementary to schooling before em-
ployed by the firm in the first several years in their job career, and, after employed by the firm,
invested in firm-specific human capital not necessarily complementary to schooling, as the
firm also learned employees’ ability that was not indicated by educational background. Work-
ers invested in general human capital at schools and workplaces before they joined the internal
labor market, and turned to investment in human capital less complementary to schooling after
they joined. This is a story consistent with the result.
While regression of wages on the interaction term between years of schooling and expe-
rience (yos  epr) on Table 3 suggests that employer learning holds, the results on Table
4 indicates that coefficient of the interaction term between years of schooling and experi-
ence (yos  epr) could be divided into two effects of before and after employed by the firm
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(yos pvr, yos ten), whose coefficients’ signs are opposite.
Employer learning is assumed to be “public” learning in the competitive labor market
(Farber and Gibbons (1996)). However, the result here, along with Galindo-Rueda (2003)
and Pinkston (2009), shows that learning effect does not dominate complementary effect of
schooling and experience as workers invested in general capital in their early stages of career.
Employers’ learning is observed rather after workers joined the internal labor market and were
separated from the competitive market, instead of “public”ly going through the competitive
market. Interaction term between years of schooling and experience (yos  epr) on Table
3 appears to support employers’ learning, but it is not because the workers ability came to
be “public”ly learned in the market over time, but because results are affected by employer’s
learning and corresponding promotion of employees after incorporated to the internal labor
market.
Indeed, coefficient of the interaction term between years of schooling and previous expe-
rience (yos pvr) is significantly positive, as that between years of schooling and experience
after employed by the firm (yos ten) is significantly negative on Table 4. Because the latter
effect is dominant, it appears, coefficient of interaction between years of schooling and expe-
rience (yosepr) on Table 3 is negative. In this sense, significantly negative coefficient of the
interaction term between years of schooling and and experience (yos epr) seems to capture
an effect of the internal labor market.
5 Discussion: implication of the empirical result
5.1 Identification of internal labor market effect and comparative anal-
ysis of labor markets
As employers’ learning hypothesis assumes learning is publicly going in the labor market,
previous empirical studies such as those based on NLSY have not differentiated employers’
learning outside and within the firm (Farber and Gibbons (1996), Altonji and Pierret (2001)).
On the other hand, the representative works of modern approach to the internal labor market
does not provide clear answer to the mixed picture, which partly supports employers’ learning,
on-the-job training, or comparative advantage hypotheses (Baker et al. (1994b), Gibbons et al.
(2005), Lluis (2005)).
Some empirical evidences indicate that long-term employment is seen and does have pos-
itive impact wages and job protection on in the American workplaces, to encourage industry-,
firm-, and/or skill-specific human capital.55 In addition, since the 1930s, basic wages of Amer-
ican workers in fact have been even more shielded to exogenous demand shocks than Japanese
and British counterparts due to institutional settings of the labor market,56 and some empirical
results support the existence of implicit contract to shield wages from macroeconomic shocks
55Hall (1980, 1982). Abe (2000), pp. 258-263. Weinberg (2001), pp. 236-251. Poletaev and Robinson
(2008), pp. 400-413.
56American firms seem to adjust workdays instead of basic wages to demand shocks. Gordon (1982), pp.
18-42.
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in the US.57.
Furthermore, exactly based on NLSY, Parent (1999) shows, first, current employers reward
on-the-job training completed with themselves, second, current employers also reward on-
the-job training their employees completed with previous employers, and third, employees
who completed on-the-job training with current employers have lower separation rate.58 The
result mentions that young American workers join long-term basis employment after they
accumulate experiences to be appreciated by the last employer.
Moreover, conjecture of employer learning in early stages has succeeded in provision of
concrete result empirical studies in an intra-firm data set59 while a study based on NLSY,
which include mixed ingredients of employees who are already incorporated into long-term
employment and yet to be gives much less clear result.60 Also here in intra-firm data of
Japanese steel industry, the faster employer learning the earlier stage principle is presented
very clearly on Table 4, as later cohorts, which capture employer learning effects on early
stages, show larger absolute value of negative coefficients of interaction term between years
of schooling and tenure (yos ten).
Along with the evidences, this case study suggests probability that existent empirical re-
sults to support the employers’ learning has been affected either by the effect of incumbent
employers’ asymmetric learning or by investment in industry- and/or firm-specific human cap-
ital, instead of symmetric learning in the competitive labor market.
The extent of asymmetry of employer learning, and the extent of complementarity between
schooling and experience could vary over economies, of course. As Galindo-Rueda (2003),
Scho¨nberg (2007) and Pinkston:2009 mention that employer learning goes a little more sym-
metrically in the US than in the UK.61 Also, investment in human capital in Germany inquired
by Bauer and Haisken-DeNew (2001) seems to concentrate in industry-specificity instead of
firm-specificity even more than in the US labor market studied by Weinberg (2001).62 If skill
is perfectly standardized within each industry different from the US, and if secondary school-
ing emphasizes vocational education for specific industries more, instead of liberal arts, then
skill is almost always general to the most workers who do not change industry in their life
courses and schooling and work experience are intrinsically complements.
Compared with the presented evidences for the US, the UK, and Germany, the result of
this research mentions that the Japanese labor market in the early half of the 20th century was
closer to the contemporary British than to the contemporary American, in terms of symmetry
of informational structure for employer’s learning, and closer to the contemporary American
than to the contemporary German, in terms of comparative emphasis on industry- or firm-
specificity of human capital investment.
57Beaudry and DiNardo (1991), pp. 675-685. Similar results for Canada are presented by McDonald and
Worswick (1999), pp. 886-888. The same institutional setting of “shielding” could make wages sensitive to
the employer’s prosperity instead of the market and thus serial correlational, as shown by Dohmen (2004), pp.
746-752.
58Parent (1999), pp. 305-315.
59Lluis (2005), pp. 745-755.
60Gibbons et al. (2005), pp. 698-714.
61Galindo-Rueda (2003), pp. 13-15. Scho¨nberg (2007), pp. 672-675, Pinkston (2009), pp. 381-389.
62Weinberg (2001), pp.236-247. Bauer and Haisken-DeNew (2001), pp.l66-177.
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To proceed such a comparative analysis, further inquiry based on panel data of employees
who work for specific firms is desired. In this sense, the literature following Lluis (2005)
that focused on employer learning and matching within internal labor markets are hoped to be
enriched, and this case study hopefully is one of them.
5.2 Learning in early stages
Table 4 also shows tnhat coefficient of interaction between years of schooling and tenure and
yosten decreases as cohort goes down. It indicates that employer’s learning went faster in the
late periods. Since later cohorts have shorter tenure, employer’s learning effect observed with
later cohorts show employer’s learning in the first few years. Lluis (2005) infers that learning
effect had larger impact in earlier tenure in internal labor markets, based on the German data.63
The result here is consistent with the inference.
5.3 Schooling, internal labor market, and dual structure
After the Second World War, the Japanese government extended mandatory schooling from
6 years to 9 years, and the number of high schools drastically increased. The explosive ex-
pansion of secondary schooling, which proceeded in the 1920s in the US, occurred in Japan
from the 1950s to the 1960s. Secondary school system in prewar Japan, introduced from Eu-
rope, was the one to train a small group of elites. It was completely transformed into massive
investment in human capital of majority people, which was a case of convergence to the Amer-
ican system of secondary education, along with convergence to the US-led technology-skill
complementary development.64
Postwar junior high schools and most of high schools have focused on general education,
not vocational education concentrating on particular and inflexible skills. The “uniquely-
American invention”65 of extended secondary school in the early 20th century was introduced
to Japan after the Second World War, accompanied with rapid increase of capital-labor ratio,
in the economic race to catch up with the US.66 It directly led to supply of higher educated
blue-collar labor force to the manufacturing sector. In despite of the rapid increase of better
educated workers, the significantly positive coefficient of postwar education dummy (psw)
on Table 3 shows that return of schooling rather increased after the Second World War.67
63Lluis (2005), pp. 745-755.
64Goldin (2001), pp. 269-275. Ueshima, Funaba and Inoki (2006), pp. 72-73.
65Goldin (1998), p. 350.
66Godo and Hayami (2002), pp. 968-974.
67This is mainly because coverage of this research is up to the 1960s. An empirical study on the manufacturing
sector as a whole indicates that wage premium with graduation of high school or more hit the highest in the mid
1960s, and had gradually declined since then (Ohkusa and Ohta (1994), p. 180-181). Ueshima (2003) argues that
the educational wage differential was squeezed by rapidly increased supply of high-school graduates (Ueshima
(2003), pp. 47-48.), as it was in the US in the mid 20th century, though institutional factors had a significant role
in the US (Goldin and Margo (1992), pp. 17-32. Goldin (1999), pp. s80-s92.). As the most of a cohort came
to enrol high school by the end of the 1970s, and the educational wage differential became an issue between
college graduates and high school graduates. In the 1980s, while wage differential between college and high
school graduates rose astonishingly in the US, the rise in Japan was relatively modest (Katz and Revenga (1989),
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It indicates that, responding to increased supply of higher-educated workforce, technology-
skill/education complementarity was augmented along with manualization of production line,
and the transition rather increased demand for more educated workers and pulled up return on
education,68 as happened in the US from the 1920s to the 1940s.69 Also, massive ivestment
in public education by the government apparently succeeded in release of the society from the
“low skill trap” equilibrium.70 As result, productivity of the Japanese manufacturing sector is
estimated to overtake the British in the 1970s, and the German in the 1980s, closing the gap
with the American though still behind.71
The Kamaishi Iron Works took the trend and invested more in higher educated workers af-
ter the SecondWorld War, as the negative coefficient of interaction between years of schooling
and Development Center dummy (yos dc) on Table 3 mentions.
While “port of entry,” where only young workers are employed and are assigned to the
lowest ladder, is a symbolic feature of internal labor market suggested by Doeringer and Piore
(1971), it is not always empirically supported.72 In the case of Japanese manufacturing, it
became a dominant practice in the 1960s, much later than formation of internal labor market
in the 1930s. It had become a common practice of personnel management of major firms
to hire new graduates and apply internal promotion not only for white collar employees also
for blue collar employees in the 1960s,73 and on-the-job training closely linked educational
background became a persistent personnel policy in Japanese firms.74 More investment in
freshmen who had just graduated high school at Kamaishi was a part of this prevailed trend.
This analysis of the micro data is consistent with the story “dual” labor market of the
Japanese manufacturing in the macroeconomic context: Better educated graduates get into
major firms, and, while internal labor market was dominant among major factories with ad-
vanced technologies such as the Kamaishi Iron Works, it was not among small and medium
sized firms. Better education and investment in firm-specific human capital brought higher
wages. Once an employee left a major firm, he could get only in small or medium sized firms
with lower technology that paid worse. The quasi-rent provided employees of major firms
with strong incentives to commit to internal labor market. This structural feature is thought to
have emerged in the 1920s and had been persistent in the 1980s.75
As manufacturing firms began to form internal labor market with modernization effort,
pp. 526-535.). Katz and Revenga (1989) suggests that it was at least partly because high school graduates in
the Japanese manufacturing were better adjusted to technological changes with support from on-the-job-training
enhanced in Japanese firms (Katz and Revenga (1989), p. 545.), which is a consistent with the result that relative
importance of tenure over total experience is larger in Japan (Abe (2000), p. 264.).
68This possible story is consistent with the theoretical prediction such as Kiley (1999), pp. 712-720.
69Goldin and Katz (1998), pp. 726-727.
70Burdett and Smith (2002), p. 1450.
71Broadberry (1994), pp. 292-295.
72Doeringer and Piore (1971), pp. 43-48. Baker and Holmstrom (1995), p. 256.
73Gordon (1985), pp. 386-411. Sugayama (2011), pp. 338-443.
74Higuchi (1994), pp. 172-174.
75Ujihara (1966), pp. 402-425. Chuma (1998), p. 262. Ishikawa (2001), pp. 241-282. Odaka (2003), pp.
126-136. The more educated, the longer tenure is still the dominant principle among large Japanese firms. Ono
(2010), pp. 13-17. As a heritage of the structure, for instance, “sheepskin” effect is much smaller in small firms.
Bauer et al. (2005), pp.
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the government increased investment in public education. Workers invested in general human
capital at schools and short-term employment, and in firm-specific human capital in internal
labor market. The society-wide transition to this direction formed divided labor market, and
this structural feature of the labor market can bee seen even in micro data.
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Table 1 Emplyee numbers, years of schooling, and previous experience across cohorts.
maximum minimum median mean maximum minimum median mean
yj1928 1 24 9 9 9 9.00 3 3 3 3.00
yj1929 1 38 8 8 8 8.00 1 1 1 1.00
yj1930 1 28 8 8 8 8.00 2 2 2 2.00
yj1931 0 0 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
yj1932 0 0 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
yj1933 3 81 8 8 8 8.00 5 2 2 2.85
yj1934 2 56 8 6 6 6.82 11 5 5 7.46
yj1935 5 141 8 8 8 8.00 9 1 1 3.96
yj1936 7 152 8 8 8 8.00 9 1 6 6.36
yj1937 7 193 8 6 8 7.75 12 1 8 6.55
yj1938 18 495 8 6 8 7.51 13 0 6 5.44
yj1939 39 1,010 9 6 8 7.91 13 0 5 5.21
yj1940 41 1,053 8 6 8 7.81 12 0 6 5.54
yj1941 44 998 9 6 8 7.85 13 0 4 4.80
yj1942 29 651 9 6 8 7.62 16 0 3 4.57
yj1943 23 522 9 6 8 7.98 14 0 2 3.87
yj1944 26 564 8 6 8 7.60 16 0 2 4.47
yj1945 17 376 8 6 8 7.77 3 0 1 0.89
yj1946 17 344 8 6 8 7.75 22 0 1 3.70
yj1947 11 203 8 6 8 7.82 3 0 1 0.98
yj1948 283 5,298 16 6 8 8.13 23 0 9 9.48
yj1949 259 4,532 15 6 8 8.09 21 0 8 8.55
yj1950 37 609 12 6 9 8.39 26 0 2 5.74
yj1951 53 857 15 6 8 7.76 21 2 9 9.36
yj1952 7 104 9 6 8 7.82 10 5 7 7.33
yj1953 13 154 12 9 9 9.16 4 0 3 2.77
yj1954 19 220 12 9 9 9.82 3 0 3 2.30
yj1955 11 122 9 9 9 9.00 3 2 3 2.88
yj1956 91 910 15 6 9 8.93 20 0 7 7.33
yj1957 69 620 15 6 9 9.08 18 0 6 6.75
yj1958 25 189 9 9 9 9.00 9 2 3 3.10
yj1959 87 586 12 8 9 10.05 15 0 3 3.83
yj1960 47 250 12 9 9 10.11 28 0 3 4.84
yj1961 35 148 12 9 9 9.16 12 1 3 3.82
yj1962 84 279 12 8 12 10.70 9 0 2 1.92
yj1963 41 71 15 6 8 8.70 35 2 20 19.51
yj1964 15 71 15 6 8 8.70 35 2 20 19.51
yj1965 9 29 12 8 12 10.72 5 1 1 2.28
yj1966 10 20 12 12 12 12.00 2 0 1 0.95
yj1967 8 15 12 9 9 10.20 14 1 5 7.40
total 1,495 22,013
Years of schooling
(yos)
Years of previous experience
(pvr)
Notes : Previous experience: Years after graduating school, before employed by the firm.
Number
of
employees
who joined
Year
joined
Number
of
observations
Table 2 Cohort effect in panel estimations.
2-1 2-2
Estimation method panel least squares
Dependent variable log(rw)
Cross-section pooled (no cross-section dummy)
Period (year) fixed (year dummies inserted)
Indepedent variables coefficient t  statistic probability coefficient t statistic probability
c -0.3643 -18.0062 0.0000 -0.2349 -9.7127 0.0000
log(yos) 0.1785 26.2363 0.0000 0.1828 27.1514 0.0000
log(epr) 0.2175 85.1986 0.0000 0.2444 84.4775 0.0000
log(ten) 0.0356 13.1963 0.0000
yj1928-1929 0.6802 30.3373 0.0000 -0.1048 -1.4048 0.1601
yj1930-1931 0.6972 25.1817 0.0000 -0.0351 -0.4159 0.6775
yj1932-1933 0.6147 30.7214 0.0000 -0.0795 -1.2426 0.2140
yj1934-1935 0.6670 39.1088 0.0000 -0.0924 -1.6770 0.0936
yj1936-1937 0.6295 40.1487 0.0000 -0.0815 -1.6164 0.1060
yj1938-1939 0.6341 44.3434 0.0000 -0.0899 -1.9786 0.0479
yj1940-1941 0.5896 42.3080 0.0000 -0.0898 -2.1161 0.0343
yj1942-1943 0.5479 39.5355 0.0000 -0.0658 -1.6606 0.0968
yj1944-1945 0.4828 35.2916 0.0000 -0.0991 -2.6911 0.0071
yj1946-1947 0.4485 32.4434 0.0000 -0.1235 -3.5827 0.0003
yj1948-1949 0.4336 34.2090 0.0000 -0.0557 -1.8772 0.0605
yj1950-1951 0.3628 28.6223 0.0000 -0.0817 -2.9965 0.0027
yj1952-1953 0.3265 23.1302 0.0000 -0.0431 -1.5500 0.1212
yj1954-1955 0.3004 22.3837 0.0000 -0.0033 -0.1311 0.8957
yj1956-1957 0.1744 14.5807 0.0000 -0.1139 -5.9023 0.0000
yj1958-1959 0.1253 10.3818 0.0000 -0.0738 -4.1333 0.0000
yj1960-1961 0.0865 6.8358 0.0000 -0.0634 -3.4739 0.0005
yj1962-1963 0.1120 9.0093 0.0000 0.0287 1.5465 0.1220
yj1964-1965 0.0081 0.5814 0.5610 -0.0077 -0.2447 0.8067
yj1966-1967 0.1772 7.5325 0.0000 0.2381 3.6260 0.0003
yj1928-1929×log(ten) 0.0214 8.8438 0.0000
yj1930-1931×log(ten) 0.0198 6.2121 0.0000
yj1932-1933×log(ten) 0.0218 9.7056 0.0000
yj1934-1935×log(ten) 0.0269 13.8477 0.0000
yj1936-1937×log(ten) 0.0267 14.7740 0.0000
yj1938-1939×log(ten) 0.0306 18.0433 0.0000
yj1940-1941×log(ten) 0.0309 18.2999 0.0000
yj1942-1943×log(ten) 0.0301 17.4422 0.0000
yj1944-1945×log(ten) 0.0318 18.0134 0.0000
yj1946-1947×log(ten) 0.0360 19.1470 0.0000
yj1948-1949×log(ten) 0.0338 20.2743 0.0000
yj1950-1951×log(ten) 0.0357 19.9709 0.0000
yj1952-1953×log(ten) 0.0342 13.8339 0.0000
yj1954-1955×log(ten) 0.0322 13.3066 0.0000
yj1956-1957×log(ten) 0.0398 20.4086 0.0000
yj1958-1959×log(ten) 0.0363 14.3649 0.0000
yj1960-1961×log(ten) 0.0349 9.4968 0.0000
yj1962-1963×log(ten) 0.0242 4.4991 0.0000
yj1964-1965×log(ten) 0.0322 3.2872 0.0010
yj1966-1967×log(ten) 0.0197 0.6700 0.5029
year dummies yes yes
cross-sections included 1,490 1,490
periods included (years) 41 (1929-1969) 41 (1929-1969)
included observations 22,045 22,045
adjusted R2 0.9622 0.9631
F statistic 8,911.6042 0.0000 7,016.7697 0.0000
Table 3 Wage regressions: indvidul effects of in-house trainng programs.
3-1 3-2 3-3 3-4
Estimation method panel generalized least squares
Dependent variable log(rw)
Cross-section random effect
Period (year) pooled (no year dummies inserted)
Indepedent variables coefficient t  statistic probability coefficient t statistic probability coefficient t statistic probability coefficient t statistic probability
c -4.4206 -49.4743 0.0000 -6.7700 -46.2059 0.0000 -16.5632 -27.1311 0.0000 -11.0425 -10.0826 0.0000
log(hgt) 2.4108 19.3716 0.0000 0.7652 3.3674 0.0008
log(yos) 1.6045 39.8490 0.0000 2.6959 40.0987 0.0000 1.5915 43.3703 0.0000 2.8583 41.6628 0.0000
psw 0.4504 45.3885 0.0000 0.3973 39.9456 0.0000 0.3858 38.6450 0.0000 0.3645 36.4727 0.0000
log(epr) 0.4876 67.0161 0.0000 2.0288 26.3525 0.0000 0.3922 47.7746 0.0000 -2.8090 -4.2099 0.0000
log(ten) 1.4919 40.2076 0.0000 0.6148 10.7650 0.0000 6.5071 25.4012 0.0000 7.9548 16.9729 0.0000
log(hgt)×log(epr) 0.9674 7.1277 0.0000
log(hgt)×log(ten) -0.9496 -18.3988 0.0000 -1.4063 -14.9899 0.0000
log(yos)×log(epr) -0.7241 -20.1249 0.0000 -0.7811 -21.7663 0.0000
log(yos)×log(ten) -0.1173 -4.3037 0.0000 -0.5635 -37.1927 0.0000 -0.1581 -6.5884 0.0000
dcy -0.4035 -3.4469 0.0006 -0.3557 -19.6829 0.0000 -0.2755 -2.9906 0.0028 -0.3143 -3.4693 0.0005
dcy×log(ten) 0.1640 3.3196 0.0009 0.1547 20.2078 0.0000 0.1046 2.7320 0.0063 0.1167 3.0809 0.0021
sy -0.3545 -19.3835 0.0000 -0.4288 -3.7114 0.0002 -0.2859 -18.8036 0.0000 -0.2860 -19.1205 0.0000
sy×log(ten) 0.1529 19.8530 0.0000 0.1742 3.5556 0.0004 0.1066 17.2821 0.0000 0.1061 17.3921 0.0000
dct -0.2782 -8.4644 0.0000 -0.2607 -8.0229 0.0000 -0.1861 -5.5985 0.0000 -0.2033 -6.2165 0.0000
dct×log(ten) 0.0861 6.5971 0.0000 0.0834 6.4294 0.0000 0.0827 6.1054 0.0000 0.0872 6.5091 0.0000
dc 0.2875 16.9174 0.0000 0.3410 20.0529 0.0000 0.3885 28.3333 0.0000 0.4665 33.4297 0.0000
dc×log(ten) -0.1194 -14.9293 0.0000 -0.1311 -16.5164 0.0000 -0.2084 -31.7769 0.0000 -0.2280 -34.8976 0.0000
cross-sections included 1,495 1,495 1,190 1,190
periods included (years) 41(1929-1969) 41(1929-1969) 31(1939-1969) 31(1939-1969)
included observations 22,126 22,126 15,774 15,774
adjusted R2 0.7153 0.7179 0.8495 0.8530
F statistic 4,276.9504 0.0000 4,023.7014 0.0000 5,937.5240 5,385.5983 0.0000
Table 4 Interaction of education and tenure/previous epxerience.
4-1
Estimation method panel generalized least squares
Dependent variable log(rw)
Cross-section random effect
Period (year) pooled (no year dummies inserted)
Indepedent variables coefficient t statistic probability
c 0.2786 7.5211 0.0000
log(yos) 0.4701 26.6533 0.0000
log(pvr) -0.0552 -7.0511 0.0000
log(ten) 0.3021 25.7110 0.0000
yj1928-1929×log(yos)×log(pvr) -0.0762 -2.1206 0.0340
yj1930-1931×log(yos)×log(pvr) -0.0721 -1.1802 0.2379
yj1932-1933×log(yos)×log(pvr) -0.0547 -2.3141 0.0207
yj1934-1935×log(yos)×log(pvr) 0.0394 3.8687 0.0001
yj1936-1937×log(yos)×log(pvr) 0.0647 8.3687 0.0000
yj1938-1939×log(yos)×log(pvr) 0.0679 12.9928 0.0000
yj1940-1941×log(yos)×log(pvr) 0.0725 15.1548 0.0000
yj1942-1943×log(yos)×log(pvr) 0.0878 17.3301 0.0000
yj1944-1945×log(yos)×log(pvr) 0.0751 13.4498 0.0000
yj1946-1947×log(yos)×log(pvr) 0.0698 10.9268 0.0000
yj1948-1949×log(yos)×log(pvr) 0.1052 29.0775 0.0000
yj1950-1951×log(yos)×log(pvr) 0.0911 22.8328 0.0000
yj1952-1953×log(yos)×log(pvr) 0.1001 15.9854 0.0000
yj1954-1955×log(yos)×log(pvr) 0.0917 14.0185 0.0000
yj1956-1957×log(yos)×log(pvr) 0.0608 16.6241 0.0000
yj1958-1959×log(yos)×log(pvr) 0.0392 9.5487 0.0000
yj1960-1961×log(yos)×log(pvr) 0.0353 7.9487 0.0000
yj1962-1963×log(yos)×log(pvr) 0.0168 3.1449 0.0017
yj1964-1965×log(yos)×log(pvr) 0.0702 11.4393 0.0000
yj1966-1967×log(yos)×log(pvr) 0.0443 5.0681 0.0000
yj1928-1929×log(yos)×log(ten) 0.0441 3.3562 0.0008
yj1930-1931×log(yos)×log(ten) 0.0421 1.9443 0.0519
yj1932-1933×log(yos)×log(ten) 0.0366 3.3057 0.0009
yj1934-1935×log(yos)×log(ten) 0.0087 1.1667 0.2433
yj1936-1937×log(yos)×log(ten) -0.0118 -1.7443 0.0811
yj1938-1939×log(yos)×log(ten) -0.0095 -1.6184 0.1056
yj1940-1941×log(yos)×log(ten) -0.0193 -3.3376 0.0008
yj1942-1943×log(yos)×log(ten) -0.0316 -5.4193 0.0000
yj1944-1945×log(yos)×log(ten) -0.0318 -5.4001 0.0000
yj1946-1947×log(yos)×log(ten) -0.0343 -5.6775 0.0000
yj1948-1949×log(yos)×log(ten) -0.0732 -13.2852 0.0000
yj1950-1951×log(yos)×log(ten) -0.0726 -12.7004 0.0000
yj1952-1953×log(yos)×log(ten) -0.0931 -13.9681 0.0000
yj1954-1955×log(yos)×log(ten) -0.0943 -15.2773 0.0000
yj1956-1957×log(yos)×log(ten) -0.0914 -16.3870 0.0000
yj1958-1959×log(yos)×log(ten) -0.1022 -17.7993 0.0000
yj1960-1961×log(yos)×log(ten) -0.1132 -17.7019 0.0000
yj1962-1963×log(yos)×log(ten) -0.1106 -16.0659 0.0000
yj1964-1965×log(yos)×log(ten) -0.0777 -8.1543 0.0000
yj1966-1967×log(yos)×log(ten) -0.1435 -9.5139 0.0000
dcy, sy, dct, dc yes
dcy×log(ten), sy×log(ten), dct×log(ten), dc×log(ten) yes
interaction of year dummy and yos: dy×yos yes
cross-sections included 1,490
periods included (years) 41(1929-1969)
included observations 22,045
adjusted R2 0.9652
F statistic 6,717.5996 0.0000
Appendix List of variables.
variable definition
rw real daily wage.
hgt height when employed by the firm.
yos years of schooling.
psw postwar education generation (12 years old or younger in 1947). dummy variable
epr experience in the labor market: age−(5+yos)+1.
pve previous experience: age−(5+yos+ten)+1.  Note: Every sample
emolyee was hired by the firm in the last year of his record.
yj19XX dummy of year joined: =1 if joined the firm in 19XX. dummy variable
yj19XX-19YY dummy of year joined: =1 ifjoined the firm from 19XX to 19YY. dummy variable
dy19XX year dammy. dummy variable
ten tenure: (years after employed by the firm)+1.
dcy 1 if completed Development Center for Youth (from 1927 to 1935dummy variable
sy 1 if completed School for Youth (from 1935 to 1948). dummy variable
dct 1 if completed Development Center for Technician (from 1939 to dummy variable
dc 1 if completed Development Center (from 1946 to 1973). dummy variable
